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1. Introduction
Compare labor productivities and incomes (per capita) across countries and ask,
Are poorer countries catching up with richer ones? Are they likely to in the fu-
ture? Or, are countries converging only within \clubs"? If so, are these clubs of
the very rich and the very poor, or is most of the world becoming only middle
class? Answers to these questions|on catch-up and convergence|are basic for
thinking about economic growth: they can be viewed either as checks on dierent
growth models or as empirical regularities to be explained by theory. More funda-
mentally, they provide direct measurements on the dynamics of relative well-being
and income mobility across economies|interest in this is the same as interest in
income distributions and mobility across people within an economy.
This paper provides a new empirical method for addressing such questions.
Of course, a vast literature (e.g., Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992), Baumol (1986))
already tackles similar issues. This paper's approach diers from those earlier
ones in a number of important ways; all the dierences, however, stem from one
simple insight. The analysis here recognizes that to address questions of catch-
up and convergence, one needs to model explicitly the dynamics of the entire
cross-country distribution of incomes. By contrast, the traditional approach of
modelling only the behavior of an average or representative economy (e.g., Barro
and Sala-i-Martin (1992)) sheds little light on catch-up and convergence.
Thus, the traditional approach is silent on some interesting questions. It is
silent on how an economy, initially among the poorest 10% of world economies, will
catch up with the richest 5%, or will converge to within the median 20%. It can
say nothing on whether the poorest economies will stagnate, permanently distant
from the richest ones: it is silent on patterns of stratication and polarization.
The traditional approach does clarify if a particular economy will converge to its
own steady state: this, however, is not catch-up, and is arguably a less interesting
notion of convergence.
To summarize, while growth economics presupposes an interest in growth be-
havior across the entire range of economies|are poorer ones catching up with
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those richer|standard empirical analyses have only looked at the growth behav-
ior of a single (representative) economy. Traditional analyses are thus unable to
properly address the original questions of interest.
Going from studying a representative economy to studying a small, select
number of economies|as done in vector time-series studies (e.g., Bernard and
Durlauf (1995))|moves in the right direction. Proceeding from there to analyzing
the dynamics of the entire cross-country distribution is the logical next step. This
paper takes that step. It renes earlier such analyses (e.g., Friedman (1992),
Kirman and Tomasini (1969), Laursen and Paldam (1982), Parente and Prescott
(1993)), and studies growth and convergence directly in terms of the dynamics of
the cross-country income distribution.
In this, the paper connects to a number of rich literatures. First, the approach
draws inspiration from studies of individual income distribution and social mobility
(e.g., Atkinson (1970), Shorrocks (1978)). However, instead of taking individuals as
the primitive unit of observation, this paper takes whole macro-economies. Second,
the focus here is on the global dynamics of the entire distribution, not on regression
coecients describing average behavior. Thus, this paper is in the spirit of early
sociological studies of longitudinal data, not the later, albeit related econometric
work.
1
A similar concern drives macroeconomic VAR analysis, where interest
lies not in regression coecients per se, but in dynamic, global properties of the
data (e.g., Sims (1980)). Third, recent theoretical work in growth has considered
phenomena like convergence clubs, polarization, and poverty traps (among many
others, Azariadis and Drazen (1990), Baumol (1986), Ben-David (1994), Esteban
and Ray (1994), Galor and Zeira (1993), Quah (1995b)); this paper can be viewed
1
Contrast the focus of, e.g., Singer and Spilerman (1976) and Brandon Tuma,
Hannan, and Groeneveld (1979) with that in, e.g., Heckman and Singer (1985) and
Lancaster (1990). Integrating both sets of concerns is, of course, possible (e.g.,
Lillard and Willis (1978)); however, this paper adopts the more direct modelling
strategy.
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as seeking empirical verication for such eects.
2
Similar reasoning had earlier motivated Quah (1993a, 1993b); see also Des-
doigts (1994) and Lamo (1995). Section 3 details how the work here improves
on those earlier studies. Three key renements, though, can be mentioned now.
First, the current work allows for explanatory variables (importantly, physical cap-
ital investment and schooling) before examining convergence properties. Second,
earlier analyses constructed arbitrary, discrete partitions of incomes to analyze
their evolving distributions. The current work removes this arbitrariness by ana-
lyzing income distribution dynamics directly on a continuous state space. We will
see, however, that these renements preserve the principal conclusions in Quah
(1993a, 1993b): the world cross section of countries appears to be polarizing into
convergence clubs of rich and poor. Moreover, the conditioning analysis below,
dierent from that traditionally performed, indicates endogeneity of savings rela-
tive to growth: the two are jointly determined. Third, the current work calculates
passage-time distributions to analyze \growth miracles," such as observed in Sin-
gapore or South Korea.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an
explicit model of economic growth and dynamically evolving distributions. In the
model, growth is due to capital accumulation; under certain assumptions on capital
mobility, the cross-section distribution of countries polarizes into rich and poor.
This section has two goals: rst, it claries how traditional analyses can incorrectly
interpret patterns of growth. Second, it motivates the empirical analysis in Section
3. Some of the results in Section 3 are only suggestive|as expected with new
methodology|and others more technically precise. The empirical analysis reveals
polarization in the world cross section of countries: over time, convergence clubs at
2
The concern in Galor and Zeira (1993) is explicitly about personal income
distribution; however, this paper will, in section 2, reinterpret that analysis to
obtain predictions on cross-country income distributions. Esteban and Ray (1994),
on the other hand, clearly intend their analysis to apply both to people and to
entire economies.
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high and low ends of the income distribution appear, and the middle income class
vanishes. Passage-time estimates, to calibrate the possibilities for growth miracles
such as Singapore or South Korea, show that the observed speed and magnitude
of these occur with reasonable (5%) likelihood. Finally, Section 4 concludes and
describes extensions.
2. Capital mobility, polarization, and convergence
I present here a simple model of growth in a cross-section of economies. The theo-
retical model has structure inspired by Galor and Zeira (1993), although emphases,
details, and interpretations dier.
3
In the model, growth can potentially occur through accumulating physical
and human capital. (In the sequel, \skill" and \human capital" are used inter-
changeably.) Skills are specic to economies; physical capital, however, is mobile,
although only imperfectly, across economies. Economies are distinguished by the
amount of human and physical capital their populations own, and by their dis-
tance from (or inversely, their degree of capital markets integration with) other
economies. Economies are otherwise identical. There is one commodity; thus, ex-
change across economies occurs exclusively through interest-bearing capital loans.
3
A referee has emphasized that the model here is no more than illustrative for
the empirics that follow: any model with cross-sectional heterogeneity and multiple
steady states would make the same general points. Those with strong intuition
on these, and interested only in this paper's empirical contribution, can proceed
directly to Section 3, after looking over Subsection 2.5 below|the empirics can be
useful across dierent motivations. However, specic points discussed in 2.5, e.g.,
the statements on conditional convergence regressions, are model-specic|thus,
the model is not without content.
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2.1. Technology
Production takes time: inputs expended this period yield output only next period.
Output produced can be either consumed or costlessly transformed into physical
capital and transferred across time.
The production technology accepts two inputs: physical capital (K) and skills
embodied in labor. Physical capital is used up in production (this is inessential,
and can be relaxed at the cost of more notation). Skills take only two values, 0 for
unskilled and 1 for skilled; increasing skill values is costly. Because by assumption
skills are bounded, ongoing growth occurs only from accumulating K.
Assume the following formalization for the description just given. With skill
level 0, input K this period produces in the next period
Y
(n)
(K) = KF
(n)
+ 
(n)
; for constants F
(n)
; 
(n)
> 0;
the
(n)
superscript denotes \no skill". With skill level 1, input K produces similarly
in the next period
KF
(s)
+ 
(s)
; for constants F
(s)
; 
(s)
> 0;
the
(s)
superscript denotes \skill". But because skill acquisition costs resources s,
net output here is only
Y
(s)
(K) =

(K   s)F
(s)
+ 
(s)
; if K  s
0 otherwise
(remember s has to be paid upfront, before production can proceed). The 0 in
the second branch of Y
(s)
indicates that skilled labor is unavailable without ex-
pending s. It is intuitively plausible to take F
(s)
> F
(n)
and 
(s)
> 
(n)
: below,
assumptions (T
1
) and (T
2
) state precisely how large F
(s)
and 
(s)
are relative to
their unskilled versions. One can thus think of the technology as comprising two
separate processes: the rst (unskilled-labor) is simply linear in inputs; the second
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(skilled-labor) can be run only after costly skill acquisition, following which it too
is linear in inputs.
Because of the assumed time pattern of production, it is natural to interpret
F
(n)
as a gross interest rate. Thus, I take F
(n)
to be at least 1|this is conve-
nient but not necessary for the discussion below. Coecients F can, however,
also be viewed as marginal products of physical capital. Coecients  are net
outputs achievable with zero physical capital. That F and  are positive constants
independent of K is inessential: curvature can be allowed without aecting the
principal results, but at the cost of complicating the calculations; with curvature,
's could also be taken to be zero, provided assumptions (T
1
) and (T
2
) below are
appropriately replaced.
Assume that the skilled process dominates the unskilled process in that F
(s)
and 
(s)
are jointly suciently higher than F
(n)
and 
(n)
:
F
(s)
> F
(n)
+ 
(n)
s
 1
(T
1
)

(s)
> sF
(s)
+ 
(n)
:(T
2
)
Assumption (T
1
) says that, abstracting from schooling costs, even were 
(s)
zero,
the skilled process would still dominate the unskilled process for K  s. As-
sumption (T
2
) says that, even were the unskilled process to improve its marginal
product to match the skilled process, the latter would still dominate for K  s by
its intercept 
(s)
being suciently large.
Assumption (T
1
) gives F
(s)
> F
(n)
; together, (T
1
) and (T
2
) imply

(s)
> sF
(n)
+ 
(n)
> 
(n)
:
The assumed disparity between
(n)
and
(s)
values involves schooling costs s: the
larger is s, the larger must be 
(s)
 
(n)
, although the smaller need be F
(s)
 F
(n)
.
It follows also that at K = s, the skills-using technology Y
(s)
dominates Y
(n)
, and
does so increasingly as K increases. Figure 1 summarizes the discussion thus far.
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2.2. People
Two-period-lived overlapping generations populate every economy. Each person
has exactly one ospring so that population size is constant through time. I assume
each generation comprises a single agent|this only saves notation and having to
say \per capita" repeatedly below. (Inconsistently, however, I will refer to \the
young" or \the old" in the plural.)
People are born unskilled but receive bequest K of physical capital from their
parents. In the rst period of their lives, they do not consume, but only decide
whether to remain unskilled or to acquire skills. Production occurs between the
rst and second periods. At the start of the second period of their lives, these
now-old receive income W from that production; they consume C and provide
bequests K
0
to their ospring. Those young who, once again, are born unskilled
receive that K
0
, and then decide on skill acquisition. The process repeats.
As in Galor and Zeira (1993), I assume the representative person has prefer-
ences U(C;K
0
); that person solves, in the second period of life, the program:
max
C;K
0
U(C;K
0
)
subject to

C +K
0
 W;
C  0; K
0
 0:
In the rst period of life, that person only needs to decide on skill acquisition which
subsequently determines W . Thus decisions occur in two stages: rst, conditional
on K, maximize W ; then choose C and K
0
optimally. Assumptions on U will be
discussed below.
Thus far the model reinterprets and simplies Galor and Zeira (1993); it is
the subsequent analysis on capital mobility where dierences manifest.
2.3. Cross-country interaction
Countries interact through borrowing and lending in physical capital. Let sub-
scripts j and k denote two dierent countries; dene R
jk
to be the gross one-period
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interest rate paid by economy j towards economy k on a loan extended from k to
j.
4
I say \towards" rather than \to" because|and this is where imperfect capital
mobility enters the discussion|I assume that economy k receives not R
jk
but only
a smaller R
k
on such loans.
The dierence between R
k
and R
jk
has a number of interpretations. Likely
the easiest of these is the \melting-iceberg" transportation costs used in regional
economics and trade: moving capital involves wastage. To see how this works,
suppose that transporting from country j to k loses fraction 
jk
in transit; simi-
larly, transporting from k to j, 
kj
. These 's might be increasing in geographical
distance between j and k; they need not equalize in opposite directions if sending
and receiving technologies dier. If economy j wants to use 1 unit of physical
capital, economy k needs to ship it (1  
kj
)
 1
. Economy k does so on condition
that it receives (1 
kj
)
 1
R
k
in the next period. To ensure that, economy j needs
to ship back (1  
jk
)
 1
(1  
kj
)
 1
R
k
after its use of the 1 unit it received. Thus,
economy j pays a gross interest rate of R
jk
= (1   
jk
)
 1
(1   
kj
)
 1
R
k
> R
k
.
In this interpretation, all that is needed is that some  be dierent from zero.
Moreover, 's can dier across country pairs so that, xing any capital-rich center,
some countries can be viewed as geographically closer to it, others further away.
A less literal interpretation is that the dierence between R
jk
and R
k
reects
lack of integration in capital markets: complete integration gives R
k
= R
jk
. The
less integrated are capital markets, the greater the disparity between R
jk
and
R
k
. In this interpretation, the previous paragraph's 's still measure \distance"
between countries, but now that distance is no longer a physical concept. (As an
example, consider that capital markets are likely better integrated between the
US and Japan, say, than between China and Japan.) Also, distance, as used here,
clearly need not be related to income levels in the countries concerned.
If there are many capital-rich lending countries acting competitively, then for
4
The subscripts order in R follows that used in Markov chain analysis, and
so should be easily remembered. Note that lower case k indexes economies while,
from earlier, upper case K denotes physical capital.
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them R
k
|the interest rate received|will equal F
(s)
, as F
(s)
is the return on
capital's alternative use in production. Therefore, in general, interest rates paid
by capital-poor borrowing countries will strictly exceed F
(s)
.
2.4. Optimal decisions and dynamic equilibrium
Economy j can borrow from abroad at gross interest rate
R
j
def
= min
k
fR
jk
g > min
k
fR
k
g  F
(s)
> F
(n)
:
Thus, the young in economy j will borrow from abroad, if at all, only to top up
their inheritance K to the amount s. Borrowing less doesn't get one the benets
from schooling and is unprotable since R
j
> F
(n)
; borrowing more is unprotable
since R
j
> F
(s)
. If K already exceeds s, the young never borrow, again, since
R
j
> F
(s)
. Thus, borrowing, if it occurs at all, is always in the amount (s  K).
Figure 2 shows the opportunity set available to the young in economy j. The
segments marked Y
(s)
and Y
(n)
are directly from gure 1. There is, however, now
an additional line emanating downwards with slope R
j
from point (s; 
(s)
); this
loans line,
W = 
(s)
  (s K)R
j
;
gives net second-period income as a function of initial K, conditional on borrowing
(s K). Call K
(p)
the abscissa of the intersection of this line with Y
(n)
; this exists
and is positive whenever R
j
exceeds [
(s)
  
(n)
]s
 1
. The
(p)
superscript is to
suggest participation in international capital markets. If K is less than K
(p)
, then
that economy does better by shutting itself o from capital markets and using only
the unskilled process Y
(n)
. Gross interest payments|if that economy borrowed|
would exceed the gain in output from going to the skilled process Y
(s)
.
Thus, provided R
j
is suciently large, values for K partition into three re-
gions [0; K
(p)
), [K
(p)
; s), and [s;1). [This partitioning is similar to that in Galor
and Zeira (1993).] The rst two regions are determined by the participation thresh-
old K
(p)
which, in turn, depends on R
j
. Fix the loans line at point (s; 
(s)
) and
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vary its slope R
j
: it becomes obvious that K
(p)
is increasing in R
j
. Threshold
K
(p)
reaches its minimum value of 0 when R
j
= [
(s)
  
(n)
]s
 1
, and it tends to
a maximum equal to s when R
j
increases without bound.
Therefore, the overall optimization program that each generation in economy
j solves is:
max
C;K
0
U(C;K
0
)
subject to

C +K
0
 W (K;R
j
)
C  0; K
0
 0
where
W (K;R
j
)
def
=
8
>
<
>
:
F
(n)
K + 
(n)
for K in [0; K
(p)
)
R
j
K + 
(s)
  sR
j
for K in [K
(p)
; s)
F
(s)
K + 
(s)
  sF
(s)
for K in [s;1):
Net income W (K;R
j
)|optimally determined by the rst-period decision on skill-
acquisition|explicitly records its dependence on R
j
. The eect of R
j
on W ap-
pears not just as the slope in the middle segment loans line, but also in determining
the threshold K
(p)
.
Under standard assumptions on preferences U , optimal decisions are interior,
and can be written as C(W ) andK
0
(W ); moreover, maximized welfare is monotone
increasing in W . If, further, U is Cobb-Douglas,
U(C;K
0
) = (1  ) logC +  logK
0
; 0 <  < 1;
then the optimal decision rules are
C = (1  )W (K;R
j
) and K
0
=  W (K;R
j
):
The second of these is a dierence equation in K; its graph is simply a -scaled
version of gure 2.
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If U were not Cobb-Douglas, then transitions in K can still be determined
from something analogous to an appropriate (non-uniform) scaling of gure 2|the
results, however, will be more dicult to characterize. Thus, I follow Galor and
Zeira (1993) once again, and assume U Cobb-Douglas. In addition, I strengthen
the assumption on  to
s=
(s)
<  < 1=F
(s)
;
assumption (T
2
) guarantees that this restriction is meaningful. The coecient 
measures, roughly, concern for future generations; my assumption therefore asserts
that the old care neither too little nor too much for their immediate ospring.
5
The -scaled version of gure 2 can then be graphed as gure 3.
In addition to altering the vertical scale, gure 3 adds a number of other useful
features to gure 2. To understand them, rst note that  > s=
(s)
implies that
the point (s; 
(s)
) lies above the 45-degree line through the origin. (Hereafter,
\45-degree line" always refers to that through the origin.) Next, notice that K
(1)
,
dened by the intersection of the 45-degree line with  W (; ) on K in [s;1),
exists, exceeds s, and is nite, by F
(s)
< 1.
Then, dene K
(1)
by the intersection of the 45-degree line with  Y
(n)
. As
the notation suggests, K
(1)
and K
(1)
will be upper and lower limit points for
the growth process. Since 
(n)
is positive, and  < [F
(s)
]
 1
implies F
(n)
< 1, a
positive, nite K
(1)
necessarily exists. Moreover, because
K
(1)
=
h
1  F
(n)

i
 1

(n)
;
5
As emphasized in Galor and Zeira (1993), this interpretation is strictly correct
only when it is next generation's utility, not K
0
, that is the second argument in
U . In that case, however, the analysis becomes harder, but does not substantively
change the conclusions below, provided there is suciently heavy discounting of
the future.
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and
 <
h
F
(s)
i
 1
<
h
F
(n)
+ 
(n)
=s
i
 1
=
s
F
(n)
s+ 
(n)
=) 
(n)
 <
h
1  F
(n)

i
s =)
h
1  F
(n)

i
 1

(n)
 < s;
we have that K
(1)
< s.
Thus far, we have established that K
(1)
and K
(1)
exist, and satisfy K
(1)
<
s < K
(1)
. Turn to K
(p)
and K
(c)
; the rst of these we introduced above as the
participation threshold; the second will turn out to be a polarization cuto level,
hence the
(c)
superscript. Whenever K
(p)
 K
(1)
, i.e., whenever R
j
is suciently
high|I will make this precise by calculating the lower limit value R

below|
dene K
(c)
by the intersection of the 45-degree line with the middle segment of
W (K;R
j
); otherwise, for K
(p)
< K
(1)
, set K
(c)
= K
(p)
. What determines K
(p)
and K
(c)
is, of course, the interest rate R
j
. Call R

the critical value for the gross
interest rate such that K
(p)
= K
(1)
: when R
j
< R

, then K
(c)
= K
(p)
< K
(1)
;
when R
j
> R

, then K
(c)
> K
(p)
> K
(1)
.
From gure 3, it is apparent that R

> [
(s)
  
(n)
]s
 1
> 0. To provide
sharper intuition, rst obtain from their denitions that:
K
(1)
=
h
1  F
(n)

i
 1

(n)

and
K
(p)
= s
"
R
j
 


(s)
  
(n)

s
 1
R
j
  F
(n)
#
:
Equating these at R
j
= R

gives
R

=


(s)
  
(n)

  F
(n)

(s)
s 

F
(n)
s+ 
(n)


;
which can be shown to exceed


(s)
  
(n)

s
 1
, as expected. The explicit expres-
sion for R

involves parameters of both technology and preferences; it is, moreover,
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independent of the particular economy j. Apart from these observations, the ex-
pression appears to have little economic interpretation. Dynamic implications from
it, however, are interesting.
For the sequel, denote the capital stock in economy j at time t by K
j
(t).
Figure 3 shows transitions in K
j
over a single period; by iteration, it gives the
entire subsequent time path for K
j
, as indicated by the arrows at the bottom.
Proposition 2.1: If capital mobility is suciently low, i.e., R
j
exceeds R

, then
there exists a cuto level K
(c)
between K
(p)
and s such that
at any t
8
>
<
>
:
K
j
(t) > K
(c)
=) lim
t
0
!1
K
j
(t+ t
0
) = K
(1)
;
K
j
(t) < K
(c)
=) lim
t
0
!1
K
j
(t+ t
0
) = K
(1)
;
K
j
(t) = K
(c)
=) 8t
0
> 0 K
j
(t+ t
0
) = K
(c)
:
The proposition establishes the limiting behavior of K from dierent starting
points; its proof is immediate from gure 3.
6
Since the cuto level K
(c)
, like K
(p)
, varies with R
j
, where an economy
tends over time depends on both its current capital stock and the interest rate it
faces. Economies having identical physical capital but having dierent \distances"
from capital-rich centers|and hence dierent R
j
's|will, in general, have dierent
6
Earlier readers have remarked, though, on what appears to be a slight puzzle.
Why do forward-looking, utility-maximizing agents allow their physical capital
stock to deteriorate, as happens when K(t) # K
(1)
for K
(p)
< K(t) < K
(c)
? For
initial K in this range, utility improves over remaining unskilled by borrowing and
thereby acquiring skills. However, after payment of the (high interest) loan, the
utility-maximizing bequest K
0
turns out to be lower than the original inheritance
K|that bequest is, nevertheless, higher than if skill-acquisition had not occurred.
The correct comparison, therefore, is between two possible paths: (i) acquiring
skills and allowing K to decline towards K
(1)
and (ii) not acquiring skills and,
again, allowing K to decline towards K
(1)
. Path (i) clearly gives higher welfare
than (ii).
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dynamic behavior: one economy could converge to K
(1)
, and the other to K
(1)
,
thus resulting in the two diverging from each other. Overtaking is also possible:
economy j could start out with a higher capital stock than economy k, and thus
appear richer, but if economy k is suciently close to a capital-rich center|or,
put dierently, is in an appropriate club or cluster of economies|then over time
economy k will overtake j.
Under Proposition 2.1, interest rates in rich and poor economies, converging
towards K
(1)
and K
(1)
respectively, need not be very dierent. Thus, rates of
convergence|determined by F
(s)
and F
(n)
through K
0
= W (K; )|could be
similar, although the convergence is to dierent limit points.
Consider now equilibrium as R
j
falls, perhaps because of better integration
of capital markets and thus higher mobility in K. With perfect capital mobility
the lower bound for R
j
is F
(s)
. Important critical values as R
j
falls, however, are
rst R

(when K
(p)
= K
(1)
) and then


(s)
  
(n)

s
 1
(when K
(p)
= 0). Under
assumption (T
2
), the smaller of these two critical values,


(s)
  
(n)

s
 1
, always
exceeds F
(s)
; thus, so does R

.
Proposition 2.2: If R
j
= R

, then K
(p)
= K
(c)
= K
(1)
but the statements on
the dynamic behavior of K
j
in Proposition 2.1 remain true.
Again, the proof is immediate from gure 3 by driving K
(p)
and K
(c)
towards
K
(1)
, or equivalently, driving the gross interest rate down to R

. Extending to
when R
j
falls below R

, gure 3 gives the following.
Proposition 2.3: If R
j
< R

, then K
j
converges to K
(1)
, independently of
the initial value.
Under Proposition 2.3, even when the initial capital stock is less than K
(p)
, the
economy still converges to the upper limit point K
(1)
. Its time path, moreover, is
interesting: the economy experiences rst low interest rates (F
(n)
), then high (R
j
),
and then low again (F
(s)
). Thus, there is at rst slow growth, then a speeding up
when K rst exceeds K
(p)
and the economy starts to participate in international
loan markets, and nally a slowing down again when K nally exceeds s. (These
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rates of growth and convergence can be read directly o the dierent branches of
K
0
= W (K;R).)
The dynamics of Proposition 2.3|convergence to a unique point|can apply
even forR
j
> F
(s)
. Thus, perfect capital mobility is not necessary for convergence,
although it is clearly sucient. With it, R
j
= F
(s)
is less than


(s)
  
(n)

s
 1
;
then, convergence from everywhere to a unique point occurs at identical uniform
rates.
2.5. Concluding comments and observable implications
This section has presented a simple model of accumulation and imperfect capital
mobility. Under reasonable assumptions, the model has two distinct stable limit
points|K
(1)
and K
(1)
in gure 3|independent of the interest rate.
If interest rates R
j
are suciently low, i.e., if capital is suciently mobile,
then K
(1)
is not observable: all economies converge to K
(1)
. Perfect capital
mobility is not necessary for this, only that there be enough capital mobility,
relative to the distribution of K extant.
With imperfect capital mobility, poor economies suciently distant from
capital-rich centers remain poor. Capital poverty, however, is relative: two appar-
ently identical economies could diverge away from each other, and end up converg-
ing to dierent points, depending on their respective distances from capital-rich
centers.
Some of the model's assumptions and predictions are interesting to examine
further; others, less so. Figure 4 shows one set of observable (and, in my view, the
interesting) implications. At time t
0
there is some initial distribution of K's across
the entire cross section of economies.
7
Geography (or history) determines the
7
Contrary to some readers' intuition, gure 4 and the word \distribution"
do not say that random disturbances have, somehow, been added to the model.
Given a set of economies, one can always dene the distribution of K's across that
cross section of economies|regardless of whether K is stochastic or determinis-
tic. \Distribution" is used here in the same sense as \income distribution" across
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pattern of capital markets integration across the distribution. Working through
gure 3 and Propositions 2.1{2.3, over time some economies become better o,
others worse o. Convergence clubs form; the distribution tends towards a bimodal
distribution at time t
1
, with the two modes centering on K
(1)
and K
(1)
. As the
gure indicates, overtaking could occur (conditions for this have been described
above).
For brevity, I will refer to the range of behavior depicted in gure 4 as twin
peaks dynamics. Such dynamics warn on potential misinterpretations of condi-
tional convergence regressions.
8
Recall that in that work, a researcher attempts to
understand the behavior of incomes across economies by estimating a cross-section
regression, \controlling" for human capital and other observable variables. What
will that researcher nd if the model here is at work?
Initially, without accounting for dierent skill levels across countries, the re-
searcher concludes divergence in the distribution of incomes: that researcher notes
that middle-income countries, initially close to each other at t
0
in gure 4, grow
apart from one another. But at t
1
in gure 4, those economies clustering around
the higher mode will have higher skills in the labor force; those around the lower
mode, lower. [To understand this just look back at gures 2 or 3.] Thus, taking
into account dierent skill levels, the researcher sees two facts: (i) convergence
for countries in subgroups having similar skill levels, and (ii) richer countries also
having a higher-skilled labor force. The researcher thus concludes: rst, there is no
unconditional convergence; second, that conditional convergence occurs once one
conditions on human capital; and third, that human capital explains cross-country
patterns of growth.
Such conclusions mislead. Instead, it is patterns of cross-country capital mar-
ket integration|how high R
j
's are|that explain everything: human and physical
capital stocks are only responding endogenously to extant integration patterns in
individuals, e.g., Atkinson (1970).
8
In the model, measured income is just an increasing function of K, and so
all statements about physical capital extend immediately to income.
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R. The polarization into rich and poor, which would vanish if capital markets were
integrated, is inappropriately interpreted as conditional convergence, explained by
human capital. More important, however, is that such conditional-convergence
analysis fails altogether to detect the rich-poor polarization.
A similar, but more subtle, fallacy arises in correlating economic growth with
interest rates. In the model, the fastest growing economies could be those ex-
periencing the highest interest rates|see, e.g., the discussion after Proposition
2.3. Does this mean that a high interest rate|low capital mobility|is good for
growth? Clearly not: in the model, economies escape poverty (i.e., prevent conver-
gence downwards to K
(1)
) through greater access to capital loans, not less. It is
simply that the fastest-growing economies are those who nd it welfare-maximizing
to take high-interest loans, despite those interest rates being high.
These potential pitfalls in interpreting cross-section (conditional) convergence
regressions add to those previously given in Bernard and Durlauf (1996) and Quah
(1993b, 1996b). Because the current pitfalls are specic to a theoretical model,
they are more directed, and thus less general. Taken together, however, these
criticisms form an important argument for circumspection in interpreting cross-
section growth and convergence regressions.
Turning back to the current model, what useful empirics does it suggest?
More generally, what are useful empirics for studying growth and convergence?
I take the model's key predictions to be on the dynamics of the cross-country
income distribution|exemplied in the twin peaks dynamics of gure 4. It is
this behavior that should be empirically studied. Such analysis allows directly
examining convergence|in the sense of poor economies catching up with rich
ones. It allows directly examining the formation of convergence clubs or clusters.
Is the cross-section distribution, over time, collapsing to a single point? Or is there
clumping around multiple modes?
9
Do parts of the distribution remain where they
9
I say \clumping" rather than clustering, to minimize confusion with cluster
analysis in statistics. Some readers have suggested that the model here is not
about clumping within distributions but instead about correlation within sub-
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began? Do parts transit from low to high, and vice versa?
These questions motivate looking at convergence empirics in a way that de-
parts from standard cross-section regression analysis. They also suggest that the
interesting empirical results are not tests of particular, tightly-specied restric-
tions. Instead, what is interesting is to document the dynamics of the evolving
cross-country income distributions.
10
3. Convergence empirics
To study these distribution dynamics, take each period's observation to be the
cross-country distribution of (per capita or per worker) incomes. The empirical
model will analyze how this distribution evolves, tracking intra-distribution dy-
namics, clumping, and long-run tendencies.
Such focus diers from that in standard cross-section or panel data econo-
metric models that study the behavior of a representative or average unit. There,
groups of countries. In a deterministic setup, the appropriate interpretation is
unclear. However, suppose one were to x R and to introduce additive iid distur-
bances on the left hand side of the equation dening W . Then, in equilibrium,
capital stocks are discrete-time Markov processes within each country, but are
independent across countries, regardless of whether those countries clump about
K
(1)
or K
(1)
. Clumping can thus occur without correlation. I conclude that
correlation is an incorrect interpretation; clumping or convergence-club formation
is the robust prediction.
10
Merely documenting, rather than testing more rigorously, is of course, only
a stopgap analysis. Taking that next step, however, is hard. This will become
clearer in the next section, but technically, what will be of interest are global,
\shape" properties in an innite-dimensional operator describing transitions of
measures. Performing appropriate inference thus means rst getting a stochastic
process characterization for the distribution of that operator, and then integrat-
ing over appropriate subsets of the (innite-dimensional) operator space. While
the way to proceed is conceptually clear, the details are hard and remain to be
investigated.
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the cross sectional averaging yields a (conditional) representative, whose behavior
need not be revealing for the entire distribution's. The current focus also diers
from that in standard time series models, as here each period's observation is not
just a scalar or a nite-dimensional vector but a distribution.
Standard econometric analysis, thus, does not readily provide a convenient
tractable model of distribution dynamics. For that, I exploit a duality property
from Markov process theory.
In the part of this theory most used by economists, the researcher observes a
scalar (or nite-dimensioned vector) stochastic process. The researcher then infers
the implied unobservable sequence of probability distributions associated with that
process. This hypothesized distribution sequence is dual to the original observed
process.
In the current work, it is instead a sequence of distributions that is observed,
while its dual|the scalar process|is implied but never observed.
11
The same
mathematics works, of course, independent of whether it is the scalar process or
the distribution sequence that is primal.
Transition probability functions describe the dynamics of the scalar process.
Dual to this, stochastic kernels describe the law of motion of the sequence of
distributions (see, e.g., Chung (1960), Futia (1982), Stokey and Lucas (Ch. 8,
1989)).
Denote by 
t
the measure corresponding to the cross-country income distri-
bution at time t. The stochastic kernel describing the evolution of 
t
to 
t+1
is
a mapping M
t
to [0; 1] from the Cartesian product of income values and Borel-
measurable sets such that:
(1) 8 Borel-measurable A : 
t+1
(A) =
Z
M
t
(y; A) d
t
(y):
11
Although articial, with properties potentially dierent from those of any sin-
gle element in the distribution, the associated scalar process could still be useful in
interpretation. Quah (1996a) has exploited this in studying co-movements between
aggregate and disaggregate uctuations.
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Such anM
t
encodes how the distribution at time t evolves into one at time t+1; it
contains information on both intra-distribution dynamics and the external shapes
of the distributions. Knowing about intra-distribution dynamics sheds light on a
range of interesting events: two countries, initially comparable, over time diverging
so that one transits to the rich part of the income distribution, the other to the
poor part; initially poor countries catching up with the rich; initially rich countries
falling behind others originally poor|in brief, the events described in gure 4.
If M
t
were time-invariant and equation (1) were augmented with a \distur-
bance" term, then (1) becomes analogous to a standard time-series rst-order
vector autoregression. Only, equation (1) takes values that are measures (or dis-
tributions), rather than just scalars or nite-dimensioned vectors. Maintaining
time-invariance in M but suppressing the disturbance|as done in VAR impulse
response analysis|equation (1) can be written as the convolution
(2) 
t+1
=M  
t
:
Iterating (2) gives (a predictor for) future cross-section income distributions

t+s
= (M M     M)  
t
=M
s
 
t
:
Taking this to the limit as s gets arbitrarily large then characterizes the long-run
distribution of incomes. Is 
t+s
eventually invariant to 
t
, so that the long-run
distribution is also ergodic? Does 
t+s
tend towards a degenerate point measure,
so that there is convergence towards equality? Does 
t+s
tend towards a bimodal
measure|as in gure 4|so that the world is polarizing into rich and poor? Cross-
sectional mobility and the speed of convergence of the evolving distributions can
be studied from the spectral characteristics of (the innite-dimensional operator
implied by) M . Variants of equation (1) therefore allow answering a wealth of
interesting questions about cross-sectional income dynamics.
Previous applications of these ideas to convergence empirics (Quah (1993a,
1993b)) have noted that the stochastic kernel conveniently and simultaneously
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informs on four characteristics of dynamically evolving distributions: (I) their
changing external shapes; (II) intra-distribution dynamics; (III) long-run behavior;
and (IV) the speed of convergence to that long run. However, that empirical work
discretized the space of income values into a nite grid: the measures 
t
are then
probability vectors; the stochastic kernel is a transition probability matrix; and
the integral in (1) becomes a matrix product. Even with these simplications, that
previous work concluded twin-peaks behavior for the cross-country distribution of
incomes.
While continuing to maintain M time-invariant, this section improves that
earlier work in three ways. First, it allows the space of income values to be contin-
uous, eschewing (necessarily arbitrary) discretization; thus it estimates the innite-
dimensional stochastic kernel nonparametrically.
12
Second, this section analyzes
a fth characteristic obtainable from the stochastic kernel, namely (V) the distri-
bution of rst-passage times for movements between dierent parts of the income
distribution. This then allows calibrating the likelihood of spectacular growth
successes, such as post-War Singapore or South Korea. Finally, whereas earlier
work gave only unconditional income distribution dynamics, this section provides
distribution dynamics, both unconditional and conditioned on auxiliary variables,
including physical and human capital investment.
In the following I study a 117-economy subset of the Summers-Heston (1991)
national incomes data. As in Parente and Prescott (1993), I take the basic data
to be the log of per worker productivity relative to the US, thus giving 116 cross-
sectional units. (I will at times refer to this also as per capita income; although
dierent in details, the overall movements of normalized productivity and income
are generally similar.) Normalizing by US leaves unaltered how countries dier
12
Such renement is useful beyond just spurious generality. It is well-known
(e.g., Chung (1960)) that discretization can remove the Markov property from
an otherwise well-behaved Markov process: important features of the evolving
distributions|intra-cell movements within a particular grid, for instance|could
be inappropriately hidden in a discretized stochastic kernel.
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from each other, but is a convenient way to remove some of the overall trend in
the cross section.
13
3.1. Conditioning
It is often unclear which auxiliary conditioning variables are appropriate in study-
ing convergence. In some well-known studies (e.g., Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992),
Sala-i-Martin (1994)) additional right-hand-side variables in a convergence regres-
sion are justied, not by a precise theoretical model, but instead only by a rough
intuition that those variables should aect long-run growth possibilities. Exam-
ples of this include measures of democracy, industrial/agricultural mix, religion,
or continent dummy variables.
Similarly, the model in Section 2 does not yield one unambiguous conditioning
regression to estimate; this is common to all models that focus on distributional
implications (e.g., Durlauf (1992), Galor and Zeira (1993), and Quah (1995b)).
In one interpretation, the model's predictive content lies entirely in its sequence
of dynamically evolving distributions. To examine those predictions coherently,
the analysis should not bring into the analysis additional variables because such
variables would fall in one of two categories. First, they can be like physical and
human capital that develop endogenously in the model, and so are not usefully
viewed as explanatory variables. Second, they come from outside the model; but
if deemed important they should already have earlier been in the theoretical in-
vestigation. The alternative view, implicit in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) and
Sala-i-Martin (1994), is that convergence should only be sought after the obvious
reasons potentially preventing it are removed. In this reasoning, one asks if con-
vergence obtains not in the original income distribution, but in the conditional
one, conditioning on those \obvious reasons."
13
The appropriate way to do this in large cross sections that have large, unknown
trend dynamics remains an important, unresolved question for future study (see,
e.g., Quah and Sargent (1993)). Treating this more rigorously here, however, would
take us too far aeld. The data appendix explains the choice of data sample.
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While the rst approach seems truer to the theoretical analysis, the empirical
method here certainly allows conditioning. Thus, some of the results below will
condition on schooling enrollment, physical capital investment, and a dummy for
the African continent.
14
The rst two variables appear in the model of section 2;
the third brings in a commonly-used dummy variable.
Unlike in standard convergence regressions, however, here the time-varying
conditioning variables are not assumed to be exogenous. Instead, conditioning
proceeds by rst regressing growth rates on a two-sided distributed lag of the
time-varying conditioning variables and then extracting the tted residuals for
subsequent analysis. This procedure yields, in large samples, an appropriate con-
ditional distribution regardless of the exogeneity of the right-hand-side variables.
15
To x ideas, begin with just investment in physical capital, and ask, Can
this be taken exogenous in a regression explaining income or productivity growth
rates? Table 1 reports Granger causality tests for bivariate VARs in productiv-
ity (per worker output) growth rates and investment shares, all relative to the
US. The table indicates signicant dynamic inter-dependence between growth and
investment. While investment does help to predict future growth, it is also it-
self incrementally predicted by lagged growth. Thus, investment cannot be taken
exogenous in a productivity growth equation.
The results in Table 1 are obtained by OLS, pooling cross-section and time-
series observations. Unlike in standard panel data application (e.g., Holtz-Eakin,
Newey, and Rosen (1988)) individual eects are not allowed in these regressions.
Permitting those would be equivalent to leaving permanent dierences in growth
rates unexplained|but it is exactly those dierences that we are ultimately trying
to understand here. The projection of growth on investment, not allowing for
14
I thank David Weil for kindly providing the enrollment data, earlier used in
Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992). Those data do not exactly match the sample
here, and so some adjustment was needed: see the data appendix for details.
15
Such two-sided distributed lag regressions are common in Granger causality
analysis, e.g., Sims (1972).
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individual eects, is precisely the best linear predictor (Chamberlain (1984)), and
thus correctly gives residuals that are the components unexplained by (or, more
correctly, orthogonal to) investment.
Table 1 suggests that regressions of growth rates on investment|current and
lagged, or even on just current investment|have no interesting structural interpre-
tation. Such regressions, therefore, do not characterize the distribution of output
growth conditional on investment the way economists usually imagine. Instead,
a more appropriate conditional distribution obtains by conditioning on current,
lagged, and future investment. This is what Table 2 presents.
Looking across the columns of Table 2, we notice a marked stability in the
coecients of the two-sided projections. Fit, as measured by R
2
, does not increase
dramatically with increasing lag lengths. The heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistic
on investment led 3 years exceeds 2 in the fourth-order two-sided projection, but
not in the third-order. In all projections, investment at lead 1 through lag 2 appear
signicant for predicting growth, but other leads and lags not consistently. In the
analysis that follows, I present results using the residuals from the second-order
two-sided projection (a compromise)|the conclusions remain unchanged were one
to take instead residuals from the other projections. By the same reasoning, I
condition also on two leads and lags of schooling, and a dummy variable for the
African continent.
16
16
Details on this are, again, in the data appendix. The analysis to follow could
be presented for diering subsets of regressors|doing so, however, quickly taxes
the reader's patience. I have chosen here to use just investment, schooling, and
the African continent dummy as the conditioning variables. The results are almost
always the same when one uses only investment in physical capital. Thus, wherever
\conditioning information" appears, little changes if this is taken to mean either
all the conditioning variables or just physical capital.
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3.2. (Nonparametric) Stochastic kernels
In the discrete stochastic kernel analyses in Quah (1993a, 1993b), characteristics
(I){(IV) derive from manipulating a transition probability matrix. That matrix,
in turn, is estimated from probabilities of transiting through an appropriate grid
in incomes space; each row of the transition probability matrix is a (conditional)
probability vector.
As already described above, in the continuous case, the transition probabil-
ity matrix becomes an innite-dimensional operator on an appropriate space of
measures. Alternatively, it can be viewed as a non-negative function dened on
current and future incomes, where, holding current income constant, the function
is a probability density over future incomes.
Figures 5{6 ((a) and (b)) show stochastic kernels describing fteen-year-
horizon evolutions of the distribution of relative productivity.
17
Each gure (a)
shows a three-dimensional plot of the stochastic kernel; each gure (b) shows a
contour plot of the function in (a). Axes marked Period t and Period t+k measure
the log of relative productivity at dierent time periods; the vertical axis in (a)
graphs the kernel. (The Technical Appendix contains details on this estimation.)
To interpret these graphs, think of them as continuous versions of a Markov
transition probability matrix. From any point on the axis marked Period t, looking
in the direction parallel to the other axis traces out a probability density describ-
ing transitions to dierent parts of the income distribution. Thus, a ridge in the
kernel piled up on the (positive sloped) diagonal shows high persistence and im-
mobility: dierent parts of the income distribution remain roughly where they
begin. On the other hand, the kernel being equal-valued as one moves parallel
to the Period t + k axis indicates low persistence: location in the future income
distribution is independent of current status. A dierent extreme where piling up
17
An early working paper version (Quah (1994)) of this paper also gives tran-
sitions over one-year horizons. Following a referee's suggestion, only the longer-
horizon results are presented here, to conserve space and because they are more
informative. The one-year results do not alter any substantive statements.
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occurs along the negatively-sloped diagonal shows economies dynamically overtak-
ing one another. Distinct peaks along the diagonal indicate \convergence club"
behavior|economies within a particular income class tend to remain in that class;
but, more importantly, over time every economy becomes attached to precisely
one such income class.
18
Finally, convergence|the poor growing faster and the
rich slowing down so that all eventually collect together|would manifest in the
kernel accumulating on a single ridge parallel to the Period t axis. In this last case,
income levels eventually equalize, regardless of whether an economy began rich or
poor. Following the earlier discussion on conditioning, when stochastic kernels are
given for tted residuals from a rst-stage regression, the convergence properties
should be read as conditional on those auxiliary variables.
Do these gures suggest convergence? Evidently not. The dominant charac-
teristic in these kernels is a ridge along the main diagonal, indicating persistence
and immobility.
19
Moreover, gure 5 shows evidence for polarizing convergence
clubs: twin peaks are directly evident in the stochastic kernel at high and low por-
tions of the main diagonal; these are particularly clear in the contour plot gure 5
(b).
18
This seems to me more exible and revealing than Durlauf and Johnson's
(1994) regression tree method for studying such dynamics, although both tech-
niques have their relative advantages and disadvantages. Ben-David (1994) gives
empirical analyses with motivations similar to mine, although models and methods
dier substantially.
19
The subsequent discussion focuses only on the point estimates displayed in g-
ures 5{6. It is possible to develop point-wise standard errors around the estimates
(see, e.g., Silverman (1986)); however, such standard errors aren't informative
for the current discussion, and could instead mislead. As pointed out earlier in
footnote 10, current interest lies in global, not local, features of the estimated
stochastic kernels. Knowing only the standard errors at particular points does not
allow us to assess the uncertainty associated with, for instance, the statement that
\the dominant characteristic is a ridge along the main diagonal." Appropriate
calibration of such uncertainty remains an important item for future research.
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Stronger evidence on this dynamic polarization obtains from the shape of the
implied ergodic distribution, i.e., the stochastic kernel's limit point.
20
Explicitly
characterizing that limit is dicult in this general, continuous model, although the
sequence of densities given in gure 6 of Quah (p. 436, 1993b)|tending towards
bimodality|is suggestive. If, instead one were to discretize the stochastic kernel,
then the ergodic distribution can be found as the eigenvector corresponding to the
leading eigenvalue of the stochastic kernel. Quah (1993a, 1993b) has calculated
exactly that, and shown that the ergodic distribution displays peaks at rich and
poor extremes with the middle portion vanishing.
21
Comparing unconditional and conditional kernels (gures 5 and 6) one sees
that ne details dier, but the global dynamics of the distribution remain roughly
unchanged. There are the same polarization, persistence, and immobility features
in both. While the conditioning variables do aect the behavior of productivities
in each country, they do not aect the dynamics of the entire distribution. (This
message will re-emerge when passage times are studied below.)
To conclude, the empirics here suggest polarization and divergence across the
cross section, the opposite of the poor catching up with the rich. The evidence is
graphical and high-dimensional, however, and it might be useful to provide some
20
Earlier referees objected to my use of the terms \ergodic" here and \distri-
bution" earlier, because|according to those referees|the model implicitly being
discussed [the evolving cross sections of gure 4] bears no uncertainty: how is it pos-
sible to discuss ergodicity in a deterministic model and, worse, without checking if
the time series are integrated? Above, I have already discussed why \distribution"
is appropriate. Use of the term \ergodic", once one has a model for how distri-
butions evolve, and one can characterize the limit point of that dynamic scheme
(from, say, Chapman-Kolmogorov equations), is standard in classical probability
theory; see, e.g., Chung (1960), Doob (1953), or especially Feller (Ch. X, 1971).
This has nothing to do with whether the model is deterministic or random.
21
Bianchi (1995), applying point-in-time tests to these data, nds bimodality
of the cross section in later years, but not in earlier ones|thus supporting the
dynamic claims made in the text.
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simple summary statistics. On the other hand, doing so necessarily hides details:
e.g., the twin peaks and clustering dynamics need no longer be as evident. Passage
times, studied next, are a convenient compromise.
3.3. Passage times
From the stochastic kernels, it is possible to infer the speed of rst passage, for
an economy to move from one part of the income distribution to another. Such a
transition speed is comparable to the rate of convergence studied in e.g., Barro and
Sala-i-Martin (1992) and Sala-i-Martin (1994): only here the concept recognizes
our interest in how an economy moves against a background of the dynamic cross-
sectional distribution of all other economies.
To understand the statistics to follow on rst passage times, it is convenient
to proceed in three stages. First, recognize that the continuous case involves no
relevant ideas beyond those present in the discrete case: the additional subtleties
are mostly measure-theoretic, and will not be discussed further in this paper.
Second, since all the interesting issues already manifest in the discrete case, a
detailed but brief description for that case will be worthwhile: I will provide this
below. Finally, in footnotes, I explain how the calculations are performed for the
continuous case|these details contain no substantive interest, but might be useful
for other researchers wishing to perform similar analyses.
Consider a Markov chain with a discrete state space and stationary transition
probabilities. Denote by 
(t)
j;k
the probability that the chain rst enters state k in t
steps conditional on the current state being j. For concreteness, one might think
of state j as corresponding to an economy being in the j-th decile of the income
distribution; thus, one might be interested in the likelihood that that economy
progresses (or declines) to the k-th decile in however many years. For xed but
arbitrary j and k, the innite sequence f
(t)
j;k
: t = 1; 2; : : :g is the probability
density of rst-passage times from j to k. When j = k, the sequence in t is
more accurately called the probability density of recurrence times for state j; then
when
P
t1

(t)
j;j
< 1, the state j is said to be transient. In words, such a state
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is eventually not observed. (In a world of convergence clubs, the region outside
those clubs would be transient.) Again, for xed but arbitrary j and k, the mean
rst-passage time between j and k can be found as
P
t1
t
(t)
j;k
: this might, of
course, be innite. The more probability the density 
j;k
places on high values of
t, the fewer transitions will be seen from state j to state k, and thus the lower the
intra-distribution mobility.
Earlier parts of this section have discussed distribution dynamics entirely in
terms of the stochastic kernel. How does |the rst-passage time density|relate
to the stochastic kernel? In the discrete case, as already pointed out, the stochastic
kernel becomes equivalent to a matrix of transition probabilities. Let Q denote
that matrix so that [Q
t
]
jk
denotes the (j; k) entry of its t-th power. Then
(3) 8t  1; and j; k :

Q
t

jk
=
t
X
s=1

(s)
j;k


Q
t s

kk
:
This states the following. Suppose that the chain starting from j has its rst
passage through k occurring at the s-th step, and, following that, the chain lands
again in k after another t   s steps: that journey is exactly one from j to k in t
steps. This path occurs with probability 
(s)
j;k
 [Q
t s
]
kk
. Taking all possible rst
passage times s between 1 and t gives a union of disjoint events that is precisely
the event where the chain moves from state j to state k in t periods; but this last
event has probability [Q
t
]
jk
.
Equation (3) gives a simple recursion by which one can calculate the entire
distribution of rst passage times:

(1)
j;k
= [Q]
jk

(t)
j;k
=

Q
t

jk
 
t 1
X
s=1

(s)
j;k


Q
t s

kk
; t = 2; 3; 4; : : : :
This calculation works for transition dynamics between discrete states in a
Markov chain. In our study, however, interest lies in transition dynamics where
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rst, the analogue of matrix Q is an (innite-dimensional) stochastic kernel, and
second, the probability of transiting to any single value of the state space is, by
continuity, zero. To get around the second diculty, I consider only transitions into
a (positive-measure) subset of income values. For the rst diculty, no purely ana-
lytic solution is available; I use stochastic simulation from the estimated stochastic
kernel representation.
22
The choice of transition events to consider is necessarily arbitrary; here, I take
the event of interest to be \growth miracles", dened as passage from the 10th
percentile of the cross-country distribution to anywhere above the 90th percentile.
To be explicit about what this means, without conditioning this event is equivalent
in 1965 to Myanmar (3.5% of US per capita income) becoming at least as rich as
West Germany (56.4%). With conditioning, this event is equivalent in 1965 to
Honduras (22.2% of US per capita income) becoming at least as rich as Luxem-
bourg (210%). (After conditioning, many countries turned out to have higher per
capita income than the US.)
The income distance to traverse in the unconditional case exceeds that in the
conditional. Despite this, the unconditional kernel in gure 5 implies a mean rst-
passage time of 201 years (5th percentile: 75; 95th percentile: 435), smaller than
the mean rst-passage time of 760 years (5th percentile: 150, 95th percentile: 1980)
implied by the conditional kernel in gure 6.
23
Thus, although with conditioning,
22
To keep the simulations well-behaved, I combined those small subsets of in-
come values that represented zero-probability, pathological events.
23
The percentile gures do not measure the uncertainty associated with these
estimates. Remember that an entire distribution of passage times is studied here;
the percentile gures are simply points along that single, xed distribution. To
check robustness, I have veried that passage times implied by kernels estimated
for dierent transition horizons|not presented here|retain the same rankings
and orders of magnitude as those described in the text. Finally, it is interesting to
observe that these mean rst-passage times are comparable to those from studies
of personal income distributions (Durlauf (1992)).
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income distances between countries become smaller, intra-distribution mobility
also falls.
One shouldn't unnecessarily emphasize the exact numbers obtained here. In-
stead, what is important is that the rst-passage time estimates are, simply put,
large. Nevertheless, \growth miracles" are predicted to occur with positive prob-
ability: in the unconditional case, with 5% probability, those spectacular events
can occur within the space of (roughly) three generations.
24
Three conclusions emerge from this passage time analysis. The rst conrms
an earlier message from Figures 5 and 6: while individual countries' productivities
are importantly aected by conditioning variables, the global dynamics of the
entire distribution are not. If anything, they only amplify conclusions available
from the unconditional distributions: persistence, immobility, and polarization
remain the important characterizations. Thus the conditioning variables leave
unexplained why rich countries remain rich and poor ones, poor. Second, because
the mean rst-passage times are large, on average, growth miracles are unusual.
Third, despite this, growth miracles over relatively short time spans, do occur with
reasonable (5%) probability.
4. Conclusions
This paper has examined the convergence hypothesis using an empirical model of
dynamically evolving distributions. A theoretical model of growth through accu-
mulation, but with imperfect capital mobility, motivated the empirical analysis.
24
I have also calculated rst passage times for other events; I do not present
those estimates, however, as they are not particularly informative for the questions
of interest here. For instance, one might consider \growth disasters," or transitions
from top to bottom of the income distributions. Disasters turn out to have distri-
butions dierent from miracles, but the exact numbers don't add further insight.
Also, one might consider less spectacular events such as transitions from either top
or bottom to the middle. Again, however, the exact numbers, don't seem to add
to the discussion in the text.
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That theoretical model shows how \conditional convergence" regressions can
mislead on patterns of growth; more interesting, however, it produces, in equilib-
rium, twin-peaks dynamics|a form of polarization across countries. The paper's
empirics nds, consistent with these theoretical predictions, that the dominant
features of cross-country income dynamics are persistence, immobility, and polar-
ization. According to these empirics, spectacular growth miracles are expected
to occur with some regularity. This set of ndings contrast starkly with the uni-
form 2% rate of convergence that has been emphasized in other work (Barro and
Sala-i-Martin (1992), Sala-i-Martin (1994)).
The tools used to document these characteristics may be of independent inter-
est. The empirical methods here dier from those common in cross section, panel
data, and time-series econometrics. They are methods well-designed to uncover
phenomena like clumping, stratication, and polarization. Examples where these
are relevant include industry evolutions; economic geography, location dynamics,
and regional business cycles; consumption risk sharing; asset market comovements;
personal income distributions and intergenerational income mobility; and disag-
gregate price inations.
The current analysis points to where further theoretical and empirical anal-
yses are useful. For one, take more general theoretical models of stratication
and polarization: this paper has suggested one way to study those eects, and has
illustrated their importance in cross-country incomes. Related theoretical work in-
cludes Durlauf (1992), Esteban and Ray (1994), and Quah (1995b); the robustness
and empirical relevance of their conclusions need to be studied. Empirically, the
stochastic kernels are no more than point estimates and remain (nonparametric
and) unstructured. Calibrating precision of the estimates; providing interpretable
structure to the continuous stochastic kernels; and parameterizing transition inten-
sities in a semi-Markov generalization|thus relaxing the Markov assumption|are
worthwhile, and currently under investigation.
25
25
Quah (1995a, 1995c) studies these extensions.
Technical Appendix
The stochastic kernels in the paper are estimated as follows: First, use an Epanech-
nikov kernel to nonparametrically estimate the joint density of log relative incomes
at dates t and t + k, choosing window width optimally, as suggested in Silverman
(4.3.2, 1986). That estimated joint density implies a current-period marginal den-
sity; calculate this by integration, and then divide the joint density by the implied
marginal. The result is the stochastic kernel graphed in the text. For presenta-
tion, the kernels have been given with greater detail wherever the corresponding
marginals are higher; see, e.g., gure 6 (a) where the grid lines become more nely
spaced in dierent parts of the income space. Contour plots in the (b) gures
are obtained by projecting vertically onto the oor of the (a) gures|the con-
tour levels were chosen after experimentation to be informative of some of the ne
structure in the (a) gures.
The literature on large-sample properties for density estimation is enormous;
the reader is referred to Silverman (3.7, 1986), and references given there, for more
discussion. Under assumptions giving consistency for the joint density estimator,
the implied marginal is also consistently estimated. Provided then that the true
marginal is bounded away from zero, the stochastic kernel is consistently estimated.
All the graphs and calculations here were performed using the econometrics
shell ts
rf
.
Data Appendix
The data derive from that given in Summers and Heston (1991). Real per worker
output is taken to from RGDPW (Real GDP per worker, 1985 international prices).
Countries in the sample were selected by rst disallowing those not having con-
tinuously available data on these two variables for the period 1960{1985. I then
also excluded Kuwait|a 3-dimensional graph of the variables easily shows the
Kuwait observation to dominate every other feature of the data. The remaining
117 countries are listed below (integers immediately before the country names are
the indexes in the Summers-Heston database). Since I always normalized rela-
tive to the US, the constant ratio of 1 for the US observation is excluded in the
calculations.
Investment in Section 3 above refers to investment share of GDP, or series I
in Summers and Heston (1991). Again, this is normalized relative to the US.
For schooling, I used the series secondary school enrollment rate in Mankiw,
Romer, and Weil (1992). That is, however, only available at ve-year intervals,
over 1960{1985. To compute the two-sided projections in the paper, one can, of
course, simply calculate the ratio of cross-spectra and spectra, averaging over the
cross-section. But given the smooth time-paths one would expect for schooling,
that will likely give much the same projections as just smoothly interpolating the
available data. Thus I used the latter, restricting the between-observed data to
be on a straight line. Schooling is again taken to be relative to the US, and so
there is no logical necessity for it to be bounded between zero and one. Given
the actual realizations, however, there were few observations where these exceeded
one by much. When schooling is used as an additional conditioning variable in the
paper, ve economies from the list below were excluded for lack of data. These
were: (8) CapeVerdeIs, (53) DominicanRep, (83) China, (103) Taiwan, and (130)
Yugoslavia.
Finally, the African continent dummy variable is directly from the Summers-
Heston database.
The 117 economies included in the analysis are:
1 (1) Algeria 2 (2) Angola
3 (3) Benin 4 (4) Botswana
5 (6) Burundi 6 (7) Cameroon
7 (8) CapeVerdeIs 8 (9) CentralAfrR
9 (10) Chad 10 (12) Congo
11 (13) Egypt 12 (14) Ethiopia
13 (15) Gabon 14 (16) Gambia
15 (17) Ghana 16 (18) Guinea
17 (20) IvoryCoast 18 (21) Kenya
19 (22) Lesotho 20 (23) Liberia
21 (24) Madagascar 22 (25) Malawi
22 (26) Mali 24 (27) Mauritania
25 (28) Mauritius 26 (29) Morocco
27 (30) Mozambique 28 (31) Niger
29 (32) Nigeria 30 (33) Rwanda
31 (34) Senegal 32 (36) SierraLeone
33 (37) Somalia 34 (38) SouthAfrica
35 (39) Sudan 36 (40) Swaziland
37 (41) Tanzania 38 (42) Togo
39 (43) Tunisia 40 (44) Uganda
41 (45) Zaire 42 (46) Zambia
43 (47) Zimbabwe 44 (49) Barbados
45 (50) Canada 46 (51) CostaRica
47 (53) DominicanRep 48 (54) ElSalvador
49 (56) Guatemala 50 (57) Haiti
51 (58) Honduras 52 (59) Jamaica
53 (60) Mexico 54 (61) Nicaragua
55 (62) Panama 56 (65) TrinidadTobag
57 (66) USA 58 (67) Argentina
59 (68) Bolivia 60 (69) Brazil
61 (70) Chile 62 (71) Colombia
63 (72) Ecuador 64 (73) Guyana
65 (74) Paraguay 66 (75) Peru
67 (76) Suriname 68 (77) Uruguay
69 (78) Venezuela 70 (79) Afghanistan
71 (81) Bangladesh 72 (82) BurmaMyanmar
73 (83) China 74 (84) HongKong
75 (85) India 76 (87) Iran
77 (88) Iraq 78 (89) Israel
79 (90) Japan 80 (91) Jordan
81 (92) KoreaSouthR 82 (94) Malaysia
83 (95) Nepal 84 (97) Pakistan
85 (98) Philippines 86 (99) SaudiArabia
87 (100) Singapore 88 (101) SriLanka
89 (102) Syria 90 (103) Taiwan
91 (104) Thailand 92 (107) Austria
93 (108) Belgium 94 (109) Cyprus
95 (110) Denmark 96 (111) Finland
97 (112) France 98 (113) GermanyWest
99 (114) Greece 100 (116) Iceland
101 (117) Ireland 102 (118) Italy
103 (119) Luxembourg 104 (120) Malta
105 (121) Netherlands 106 (122) Norway
107 (124) Portugal 108 (125) Spain
109 (126) Sweden 110 (127) Switzerland
111 (128) Turkey 112 (129) UK
113 (130) Yugoslavia 114 (131) Australia
115 (132) Fiji 116 (133) NewZealand
117 (134) PapuaNGuinea
Section 3 uses two-sided conditioning regressions for growth, and then ana-
lyzes their unexplained residual components. Call X
j
(t) the j-th economy's period
t log relative income, i.e., log(Y
j
(t)=Y
0
(t)). The unexplained, residual components
in X are calculated as follows: take tted values from the two-sided projections,
and accumulate them, country by country, to get the time-varying trend paths,
g
j
(t), explained by the accumulation of the conditioning variables, physical capi-
tal, schooling, the African continent dummy. This determines up to an additive
constant level the component for each economy unexplained by physical capital.
To get that level, recognizing that the resulting location must be related to the
conditioning variables for each country, we solve the minimization program:
min
a;b;c
X
j
X
t
[X
j
(t)  (a  I
j
+ b  S
j
+ c  dummyAfrica+ g
j
(t))]
2
where I
j
and S
j
are the (time-)average investment and secondary schooling for
economy j. (Coecients b and c can be set to zero if schooling and the African
continent dummy are omitted.) Dene our basic data to be the dierence between
actual and tted time paths, i.e., X
j
(t)  a  I
j
  b  S
j
  c  dummyAfrica  g
j
(t).
The procedure I have just described seems to me one natural, convenient way
to calculate that component of a country's per capita income log level explained
by its (accumulation of) conditioning variables. As one might expect from studies
of time-detrending (e.g., Nelson and Kang (1981)) the absolute location of the
explained component is crucial in the whole exercise. Here, I have used the cross-
section variation in I
j
, S
j
, and dummyAfrica to tie down that absolute level.
The general problem here is one of decomposing a time series (per worker
output) into a growth component that can be explained by a set of conditioning
variables and one that cannot. That question might well be subject to the identi-
cation diculties as discussed in Lippi and Reichlin (1994) and Quah (1992)|here,
however, I have chosen one particular identication scheme. Other identication
schemes might give dierent answers, but for reasons of space, I will have to leave
that for future research.
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Table 1: Bivariate VAR
Exclusion Tests on Other Variable in Bivariate VAR

2
statistic (marginal signicance levels in parentheses)
a
VAR: Per worker output growth rates (relative to
US); investment share of GDP (relative to
US); includes a constant in each equation.
Sample: 116 economies, 1963+m through 1985, where
m is the VAR lag length.
Left hand VAR lag length
Variable 2 3 4
Growth 11:1  17:5  26:7 
4:5 (0.10) 9:3 (0.02) 18:0 
Investment 60:2  60:3  75:0 
24:1  18:9  26:2 
a
The rst row for each left-hand side variable gives the 
2
statistic (and implied
marginal signicance level) for the exclusion test using the standard OLS estimated
covariance matrix. The second row uses White's heteroskedasticity-consistent co-
variance matrix estimator. An entry  (in place of the marginal signicance level)
indicates a value less than 0.005.
Table 2: Conditioning Regressions (Two-sided Projections)
a
Dependent Variable: per worker output growth rates (percentage,
relative to US).
Sample: 116 economies, 1963{1985 (truncating time di-
mension for leads and lags).
Conditioning: investment share of GDP (percentage, relative
to US).
Investment Coecients in Two-sided Projections
Lead 4  0:39 (0.7/0.8)
3 1:47 (0.6/0.8) 1:89 (0.8/0.9)
2  0:71 (0.6/0.9)  1:61 (0.8/1.0)  1:42 (0.8/1.1)
1 4:93 (0.8/1.4) 4:62 (0.8/1.5) 4:55 (0.9/1.6)
0 6:90 (0.8/1.4) 6:90 (0.8/1.4) 7:35 (0.9/1.5)
Lag 1  6:13 (0.8/1.2)  6:00 (0.9/1.2)  6:09 (0.9/1.4)
2  3:36 (0.6/0.8)  2:87 (0.9/1.1)  2:88 (1.0/1.2)
3  1:16 (0.7/0.8)  0:37 (1.0/1.3)
4  1:07 (0.7/1.1)
Constant  0:61 (0.3/0.4) 0:00 (0.3/0.4)  0:16 (0.3/0.4)
Sum of Coes.
b
1:63 1:25 1:57
R
2
0.15 0.15 0.17
a
Each column reports estimates of the coecients in the projection. Numbers in
parentheses are rst the OLS and then White heteroskedasticity-consistent stan-
dard errors. It is possible to calculate serial correlation-robust standard errors as
well; I have not done so here only because rst, these projections aren't of interest
in themselves, and second, per capita worker growth rates are already close to
being serially uncorrelated. See, e.g., the working paper version of Quah (1993a)
(to save space there, the published version excluded results on growth rates).
b
Sum of coecients on (leads and lags of) investment.
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Figure 5(a): Stochastic Kernel, 3d plot
Dynamics of the Cross-country distribution of Output Per Worker
15-year transitions
Figure 5(b): Stochastic Kernel, Contour plot
Dynamics of the Cross-country distribution of Output Per Worker
15-year transitions
Probability contours at 0.1, 0.3, 0.55
Figure 6(a): Stochastic Kernel, 3d plot
Dynamics of the Cross-country distribution of Output Per Worker
Unexplained by K, H, and D
15-year transitions
Figure 6(b): Stochastic Kernel, Contour plot
Dynamics of the Cross-country distribution of Output Per Worker
Unexplained by K, H, and D
15-year transitions
Probability contours at 0.2, 0.4, 0.7
